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Abstract
This paper draws on the results of various projects undertaken by the European
Commission regarding transport pricing reform in Europe. It begins with an account of
current European policy and practice. It then considers the issue of measurement of
marginal social cost, the remaining controversies that surround it, and the barriers to its
implementation. Finally it draws on case studies to consider what would be the
implications for prices and levels of traffic on the various modes if marginal cost pricing
was implemented in practice.
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Introduction
The European Commission has long taken an interest in transport pricing
issues, particularly with regard to pricing of infrastructure and interna-
tional trac. But until recently this interest has been largely from the point
of view of ensuring fair competition and preventing discrimination by
governments to favour their own economies. A major step forward was
taken with the publication of the Green Paper Towards fair and ecient
pricing in transport in 1995 (CEC, 1995), in that the importance of pricing
to re¯ect external cost was recognised, and this was taken further in the
White Paper on Fair payment for infrastructure use in 1998 (CEC, 1998).
The latter put a clear case for marginal cost pricing, while recognising that
the movement towards this target would need to be phased over a number
of years, and that second-best measures to achieve desired levels of cost
recovery would continue to be necessary.
The ¯urry of activity on the policy front has been accompanied by a
substantial Commission funded programme of research on marginal cost
pricing, including issues of how to measure marginal social cost, including
environmental externalities; how to implement marginal cost pricing; and
what would be the consequences for price and trac levels were it to be
implemented. These projects included PETS (Pricing European Transport
Systems; Nash et al., 2000), a project that both explored the methodology
for measuring marginal social cost and undertook a series of case studies
to examine the implications of measuring marginal cost pricing in practice.
PETS also took responsibility for synthesising the results of a number of
projects in the transport pricing ®eld, including a project that measured
the internal and external costs of the diVerent modes of transport on a
number of trans-European corridors (QUITS), a project that developed a
strategic model of a number of cities and regions to examine alternative
transport pricing and regulatory decisions (TRENEN II), and two pro-
jects that examined the results of a number of actual or modelled case
studies of pricing reform or of demonstration projects (EUROTOLL and
TRANSPRICE). All these projects subsequently participated in a Con-
certed Action on Pricing (CAPRI), in which the results of the projects were
presented to, and debated with, experts from the Commission and the
member states.
This paper draws on the results of all these projects to consider the
current position regarding transport pricing reform in Europe. It begins
with an account of current European policy and practice. It then considers
the issue of measurement of marginal social cost, the remaining con-
troversies that surround it and the barriers to its implementation. Finally
Journal of Transport Economics and Policy Volume 35, Part 3
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it draws on the case studies in the above projects to consider what would
be the implications for prices and levels of trac on the various modes if
marginal cost pricing was implemented in practice.
Current European policy and practice
The White Paper Fair payment for infrastructure use (CEC, 1998) and its
predecessor the Green Paper Towards fair and ecient pricing in transport
(CEC, 1995), emerged from an environment of considerable turbulence in
the transport ®eld. A range of needs at Member State and European level
were apparent, including the need to manage transport capacity more
eciently, to ®nance transport infrastructure, and the need to improve the
eciency of the transport sector by means of institutional reform invol-
ving deregulation and privatisation.
The framework contained in the Green and White Papers represented
the Commission’s endeavours to provide a comprehensive pricing princi-
ple across modes that would ensure that in times of change there was a
underlying scienti®c basis for the development of pricing in the transport
market.
The core features of the White Paper focused on the need to relate
charges more closely to the underlying marginal social costs associated
with infrastructure use, extending these costs to include external costs, and
with the need to depart from prices that are purely based on the direct
costs of infrastructure use when cost coverage requirements need to be
met. The need to ensure transparency, and facilitate fair competition
between modes, within modes, and across user types was emphasised.
Furthermore, the contribution of transport services to the enhancement of
industrial eciency and European competitiveness was recognised.
The following mode-speci®c pricing policy developments have either
stemmed from the Green and White Papers or have emerged in parallel
with them.
Road Freight There have been major problems in the road freight
sector, caused by the fact that diVerent countries have very diVerent
methods and levels of charging for infrastructure use. All countries
combine annual vehicle licence duties with fuel tax, but some countries
supplement these with speci®c tolls on motorways, or with a ‘‘vignette’’,
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which is a general supplementary licence for heavy goods vehicles to use
the motorways of the country in question.
The result is that vehicles licensed in a country with low annual licence
duty plus supplementary tolls may have an unfair competitive advantage
when competing with a vehicle licensed in a country with high licence duty
and no supplementary tolls. The ‘‘Eurovignette’’ directive, CEC (1996a),
was intended to set a limit for the maximum infrastructure access charges
payable, on the basis of average infrastructure costs, with non-dis-
crimination between goods vehicle operators of diVerent nationalities, to
limit his problem.
Rail The process of seeking to facilitate open access, enabling ‘‘on the
rails’’ competition, was begun by Directive 91/440 (CEC, 1996b). This
sought to separate accounting for infrastructure and operations in order to
make the basis for infrastructure charging transparent, while opening
access for speci®c types of international services. A recent directive on rail
infrastructure charging (CEC, 2001), requires marginal social cost to be
used as the basis of charging, while permitting supplementary charges
where necessary for cost-recovery purposes.
Ports The Green Paper on seaports and maritime infrastructure,
CEC (1997a), has sought to establish principles for port access charging
based on the underlying costs of port operations and the need to ensure
fair competition between ports Ð particularly those in adjacent coun-
tries.
Airports The directive on airport charges, CEC (1997b), seeks a
similar system of charging to that for ports, again based upon under-
lying cost structures and a desire to ensure fair competition between
airports.
Both of the latter directives still seem to emphasise total cost recovery
rather than marginal social cost pricing, perhaps because the issue of
preventing the use of state aids to give unfair competitive advantage has
long been a major issue in this sector.
It will be clear from the above that existing practice, and indeed the
requirements of existing European legislation, are by no means fully
consistent with the principle of marginal cost pricing. Indeed there is a
long-term emphasis on full cost recovery in many countries and modes.
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The reasons for this vary, but include:
* The growing approach of treating transport as a commercial activity
subject to the market mechanism, provided by private or public
commercial organisations, as a way of improving eciency and
innovation;
* Financial constraints on governments;
* A widespread view that total cost recovery is fair;
* A view particularly in ports and airports that total cost recovery is
necessary to achieve fair terms of international competition, and to
prevent countries from over-investing in order to divert trac from
their neighbours;
* A view that marginal social cost pricing would be very complex both to
calculate and to implement, and that there are many unresolved issues
regarding its measurement.
The result is that increasingly long distance public passenger transport,
freight transport by all modes, ports and airports are seen as facilities and
services that should be operated on a commercial basis and not be sub-
sidised except in speci®c cases where this is necessary to secure an adequate
service.
Local public transport is subsidised in most European cities and rural
areas. However there is little sign that marginal cost pricing principles are
used to determine fares. Rather, a combination of political factors
including revenue needs and resistance to price increases combines to
create prices that are high in some countries and very low in others.
Road transport is more complicated. Generally, vehicle owners pay an
annual ®xed sum to license the vehicle for use, plus fuel tax when using the
vehicle. Clearly this allows a degree of diVerentiation by type of vehicle,
but that diVerentiation takes the form either of a ®xed sum unrelated to
use, or of fuel tax, the relation of which to vehicle type is determined by
fuel consumption rather than by any variable that is of use to policy
makers. Some countries have supplementary tolls on motorways, or
require purchase of a vignette to use the motorway system, while a few
cities have toll rings to enter the city. All of this adds up to a pricing
structure ill-suited to re¯ecting the variation in marginal social cost by
time and place.
There are very few cases, predominantly relating to infrastructure
charges in the Nordic countries, where explicit reference to marginal social
cost is made in the determination of pricing structures and levels. It
therefore appears that currently very little use of marginal social cost
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pricing is made in practice in Europe. The following sections consider
some of the reasons for this, and the prospects for overcoming them.
Measurement of marginal social cost
Many non-economists, and some economists, believe that the concept of
marginal social cost is simply too dicult to measure in practice, and that
the degree of disagreement amongst economists even about principles, let
alone actual values, is evidence of this.
Despite a lack of clarity in the Green Paper, the Commission appears to
follow essentially a short-run marginal cost approach. This is the ®rst
continuing source of debate, as many academics and policy makers prefer
a long-run marginal cost approach. Since it is well known that the two are
equal when capacity is optimal the debate is only relevant in the case of
non-optimal capacity. In this case there is a trade-oV. Short-run marginal
cost pricing makes optimal use of existing capacity. However, long-run
marginal cost pricing is a better re¯ection of what prices will adjust to as
capacity is optimised, and therefore a better guide to decisions such as
location or car purchase, which are not quickly and costlessly reversible.
There is a surprising lack of research on this trade-oV. What does appear
clear is that in circumstances in which there are constraints that prevent
capacity from adjusting, which may be true in many urban areas, short-
run marginal cost pricing is most relevant, whereas in circumstances in
which capacity fairly smoothly and rapidly adjusts to demand, long-run
marginal cost pricing may be more appropriate. In the PETS project this
was taken to justify a general short-run marginal cost pricing approach to
infrastructure pricing, on the grounds that time lags and indivisibilities
lead to very slow adjustment, but an approach to pricing transport services
that took account of changes in the size and nature of the ¯eet of vehicles.
A second ongoing debate concerns the nature and degree of economies
of scale in the transport sector. It is generally accepted that transport
infrastructure is subject to economies of scale, so that marginal cost
pricing implies subsidies. However, it is sometimes argued that areas where
there are particularly high costs of expansion (urban areas), and therefore
congestion or scarcity of capacity, balance the areas where marginal cost is
below average cost, making a total cost recovery constraint reasonable.
What is often ignored, however, is economies of scale in transport
operations. Indeed the evidence of constant returns to scale in terms of
®rm size in transport operations is often taken to imply that this is not an
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issue. What is relevant for pricing, however, is the marginal cost of
increases in trac on a speci®c route. Whenever extra capacity can be
provided by running larger vehicles or longer trains this is likely to be
below average cost. Even where this is not the case, however, on scheduled
transport services the so-called Mohring eVect, whereby increases in
patronage lead to more frequent services, bene®ting existing passengers,
leads to a general case for subsidising scheduled transport services, with
the case being stronger the more important schedule delay or waiting time
is in the total generalised cost (Jansson and Lindberg, 1998).
A third debate concerns the methodology for valuing environmental
externalities. The preferred approach is to measure the damage directly,
via a dose response approach combined with an estimate of the com-
pensation required to accept the resulting eVects. However, in some areas,
such as global warming, the uncertainties involved are enormous. For
instance, the ExternE project (quoted in Christensen et al., 1998) produced
a range of values of $50 to $160 per tonne of carbon based simply on
disagreement about the discount rate to be used. In such cases, some argue
for an approach based on the shadow price implied by a politically
determined target. This can make a very large diVerence to the values used
(Mauch and Rothengatter, 1994).
The analysis in PETS incorporated the Mohring eVect, and took upper
and lower values for both global warming and the value of the external
costs caused by accidents. It will be seen below that, despite the range of
values resulting, fairly clear conclusions can be drawn about the required
direction of change in prices in the majority of cases.
Barriers to marginal social cost pricing
Apart from the problem of measuring marginal social cost, we have
already seen that a number of other barriers to the implementation of
marginal social cost pricing exist. The key barriers are as follows:
Commercialisation
There is a strong belief in many European countries as well as in the
Commission itself that transport services will be more eciently provided
if their provision is subject to normal commercial decision taking, and
indeed in some cases if provision is privatised. This is not necessarily a
barrier to marginal social cost pricing; for instance in a competitive
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industry with constant returns to scale, it will be sucient to introduce
speci®c taxes and subsidies to re¯ect the external costs and bene®ts of the
product.
But we have already seen that the transport sector is subject to
extensive economies of scale. Marginal cost pricing would then inevitably
require some combination of government control over prices and of
subsidies. The most obvious means of implementation of this is by fran-
chising, and such an approach is at work in some European countries both
for the provision of public transport services and for road infrastructure.
Franchising appears to be eVective as a way of reducing production costs,
but of course will not satisfy those who argue that the private sector
should be left free to take pricing and service decisions on its own initia-
tive.
Cost recovery
There is a widespread belief that the demands for public expenditure
exceed what can be ®nanced from politically and economically acceptable
levels of taxation, and that therefore levels of cost recovery from sectors
such as transport must exceed what would be achieved by economically
ecient prices. We have already pointed out that it is not necessarily the
case that ecient pricing in transport would lead to an overall increase in
government spending as there may be many circumstances in which prices
are too low rather than too high. However, if it is necessary to aim for
higher levels of cost recovery than would be achieved by marginal social
cost pricing, then the appropriate second-best pricing policies Ð com-
bining multi-part tariVs with Ramsey pricing Ð are familiar and readily
applicable in transport.
Equity
A more dicult argument to deal with regarding marginal social cost
pricing is that of equity. There is a strong conviction amongst many
politicians and the public at large that it is fair for the users of each mode
to cover its total cost in the charges they pay. To the extent that this
principle rests on a belief that people should be charged the costs they
impose on society, it would appear that there is a much stronger case for
arguing that marginal social cost pricing is fair. Fixed or joint costs would
then be ®nanced in the most economically ecient way possible, modi®ed
by consideration of the income distribution of those bearing the charges
(Feldstein, 1972) if it is accepted that distributional considerations cannot
be fully dealt with by the tax and income supplementation system.
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The result would certainly be that divergences between price and
marginal social cost would on average be greater for modes and services
used more by the better oV, as well as for those where demand was less
price sensitive. But there is no reason to suppose that this would in general
result in total cost recovery at the level of the individual mode as a whole
even for those modes.
International competition
The argument that total cost recovery is necessary for the terms of
international competition to be fair is similarly a strange argument at ®rst
sight to an economist. The basis for this seems to be a belief that, for
instance in ports, there is a tendency to provide excessive capacity to
attract trac to the country concerned, and that this will lead to low
marginal costs. Total cost recovery therefore appears to be aimed more as
a way of constraining capacity expansion than as a pricing measure in its
own right. In this it may be eVective, and any bene®ts from this source
would need to be set against the costs in terms of inecient use of the
capacity actually provided.
Complexity
It is often argued that marginal cost pricing would be very complex,
requiring highly diVerentiated pricing systems in time and space. These
would be expensive to provide and confusing to users. This may well be
true of a system that accurately re¯ected marginal social cost in all cir-
cumstances. But of course the basic principle of marginal cost pricing is
compatible with much simpler approaches in practice, which incorporate
well-known results on the optimal degree of complexity in pricing systems
(Turvey, 1971).
None of the above arguments against marginal social cost pricing
principles seem to be very convincing, and it is hard therefore to under-
stand why so little progress has been made towards marginal cost pricing
in practice in the transport system. Obviously, much of the opposition
comes from those who perceive themselves as losing from the change, and
this indicates a need to draw up packages of measures that are com-
plementary not purely in an economic sense but also in terms of practical
politics Ð to put it crudely there is a need to redistribute some of the
bene®ts of marginal cost pricing to buy oV the opposition.
But there is an argument that has stronger economic justi®cation, and
that is the often expressed fear that marginal social cost pricing will have
undesirable side eVects, for instance, in terms of locational decisions, land
use, or general economic development. If marginal social cost pricing was
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being universally introduced, then there would be less justi®cation for this
fear. But these are areas where externalities and pricing distortions
abound, and it is a well known principle of second-best theory that
introducing marginal social cost pricing in some sectors and not others
cannot be guaranteed to improve welfare, particularly where there are
close relationships between the sectors in question. Surprisingly little
research under the fourth Framework Programme examines these issues,
which are a priority for further research.
Results of case studies
A number of case studies relating to strategic transport routes in Europe
were carried out within the PETS project. These case studies examine
practical implications of improved transport pricing, that is, prices for
transport use that more eVectively re¯ect the social costs that transport
users impose on others, and the implications for modal shares for the year
2010.
The ®ve PETS case studies that were carried out for 2010 were:
Case Study Coverage
Cross Channel Passenger and freight
Transalpine Freight
Finnish Passenger and freight
Oslo-Gothenburg Passenger
Lisbon Passenger
Table 1 presents the changes in passenger prices implied by the low and
high valuations of externalities. It is seen that for all the inter-urban case
studies, the price of motoring should be reduced, with the reduction
naturally being very much more for the low values than the high values.
The reason for this is the relatively high level of taxation on motoring, and
the expected reductions in externalities by 2010. In particular, it has been
assumed that full implementation of the AUTO-OIL proposals regarding
tighter emissions controls has taken place, greatly reducing the level of air
pollution, and in all the inter-urban corridors further road building is
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assumed, leading to modest levels of congestion in 2010. Of course the
question should be asked whether the proposed infrastructure investment
is justi®ed, and it may be that investment is justi®ed to enhance quality
rather than to reduce congestion, but that issue lay outside the scope of the
current project.
It is also the case that inter-urban bus, rail, and air all appear to be
overpriced according to these case studies. In the case of air, this is because
all the countries concerned have some form of taxation on air transport,
such as the air passenger duty in the UK. For the other modes, the
principle reason is the application of commercial pricing systems in a
sector where there are eVectively economies of scale, created in the case of
rail partly through economies of scale in infrastructure, but also for all
modes the combination of economies of large vehicles or trains together
with the Mohring eVect whereby additional passengers lead to the pro-
vision of more frequent services, which confers a bene®t on existing pas-
sengers. The net eVect of these price changes is a general increase in inter-
urban trac on all modes, but particularly for rail and air. Rail operators
appear well aware of low marginal costs in relation to average costs, as in
the practice of price discrimination most discounted fares lie well below
the average cost. The changes are not generally dramatic, however.
Naturally, the urban case study is very diVerent. Even at the low value
of externalities, car prices should increase signi®cantly, particularly in the
peak. Table 1 indicates an overall reduction in bus fares, although this
disguises a dramatic increase in peak fares (due to subsidies in excess
of marginal production and external costs) that is more than oVset by
Table 1
Changes in Passenger Prices, Unconstrained Marginal
Cost Pricing Scenario (ECU/100 passenger km)
Case Study Cost Estimates Car Bus Train Air
Cross-Channel low ¡2.14 Ð ¡3.02 ¡2.27
high ¡0.74 Ð ¡2.85 ¡1.16
Finnish low ¡2.24 ¡2.96 ¡4.06 Ð
high ¡0.49 ¡2.56 ¡4.04 Ð
Oslo±Gothenburg low ¡2.57 ¡1.18 ¡1.26 ¡5.71
high ¡0.80 ¡0.51 ¡1.22 ¡4.54
Lisbon low +1.19 ¡1.72 ¡0.90 Ð
high +3.37 ¡1.65 ¡0.87 Ð
Note: 1995 prices, 2010 values.
Pricing European Systems Nash and Sansom
373
oV-peak fares that eVectively fall to zero (as substantial excess capacity
means that service levels would not increase with additional passenger
demand). For rail a modest overall reduction is called for, again the net
eVect of substantial peak period rises and large oV-peak reductions.
In the case of freight (Table 2), the results are more diverse. Road
freight appears to be undercharged, with the exception of the Transalpine
corridors through Switzerland, where the existing high charges mean that
at the low valuation of externalities charges are too high. Compare these
directions of change for 2010 with the ®ndings in Suter’s article in this
issue that, on introduction in 2001 the net impact on Transalpine freight of
the Heavy Vehicle Fee and raising the weight limit from 28t to 40t will be
to reduce charges on international transit movements.
Under-charging for long distance road freight is particularly the case in
countries such as Britain, where the costs of heavy goods vehicles are
charged for to a large extent via an annual lump sum tax (vehicle excise
duty), which does not vary with the distance the vehicle travels.
Rail freight charges are also found to increase in the Cross Channel
case study, and in the Transalpine case study when the high valuation of
externalities is adopted. In these circumstances, it is found that existing
subsidies to rail freight are excessive. In the Finnish case study there is a
modest reduction in rail tariVs. In no case is the change in freight tariVs
sucient to cause a dramatic change in mode split, although in the Swiss
case study the low valuation of externalities leads to rail losing its existing
high market share for transit trac.
Of course these conclusions must be subject to caveats. No attempt has
been made to value all external eVects Ð for instance water pollution has
been ignored, and upstream eVects of production of inputs for the
Table 2
Changes in Freight Prices, Unconstrained Marginal
Cost Pricing Scenario (ECU/100 tonne km)
Case Study Cost Estimates HGV Train
Cross-Channel low +1.26 +1.50
high +2.09 +1.60
Finnish low +1.13 -0.27
high +1.58 -0.26
Transalpine low ¡4.80 +0.28
high ¡1.19 +2.02
Note: 1995 prices, 2010 values.
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transport sector such as vehicles was outside the scope of the project.
Moreover, there is a history of both the number of externalities identi®ed
increasing and of increases in the valuation of the known externalities, and
there is particular uncertainty about the eVects of high altitude emissions
from aircraft. However, it is asserted that these omissions would not lead
to a major change in the conclusions.
Related research evidence on pricing innovations
In parallel with the PETS project a range of pricing-related research
projects was sponsored by the European Commission. This research
included methodological development of estimation techniques, analyses
similar to PETS of the diVerence between existing charges and marginal
social costs, demonstrations of new pricing instruments and examination
of implemented schemes, and issues of how to develop pricing strategies.
Perhaps the most notable methodological development has been in the
estimation of environmental externalities. Bottom-up methods for deter-
mination of values for local and regional air pollution have been devel-
oped in the ExternE Transport project (Friedrich et al., 1998). These
methods are known as the ‘‘impact pathway approach’’ since they follow
the chain of events from tailpipe emission, through dispersion to quanti-
®cation of physical impacts in health and non-health terms. The ®nal step
is to convert to monetary values by applying values per unit of impact. In
both ExternE Transport and QUITS (QUITS, 1998) projects this tool has
been used in estimating costs that show a high degree of variation with
factors such as location, time period, and vehicle/engine technology.
Both PETS and a similar project, TRENEN II (Proost and Van
Dender, 1999), have made use of these methodological developments in
examining diVerences between current prices and marginal social costs. In
the case of TRENEN II the reference year was 2005 and case studies were
created for ®ve urban and two inter-urban situations. As with the single
urban case study in PETS, the TRENEN II urban case studies highlight a
very signi®cant degree of under-charging for car. They also establish the
need for much greater peak/oV-peak diVerentials for rail and bus trans-
port, and the overall pattern is for rail prices to fall and bus fares to
increase. For the inter-urban case studies in TRENEN II a more varied
picture emerges, with passenger and freight road-based modes modestly
under-charged, but with rail under- or over-charged depending on the
degree of subsidy.
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In the ®eld of analysing the travel demand impacts of new pricing
instruments EUROTOLL (LETS, 1999) has examined both implemented
and demonstration road charging schemes, while CONCERT-P (TTR,
1998) has focused on the latter. The implemented schemes studied in
EUROTOLL included time-period variation on toll roads by time of day
(A1 into Paris, where tolls in the Sunday afternoon busy period for return
to Paris are 20 per cent higher than at other time periods) and by season
(A5/A6 holiday routes, for which the tolls on the A6 route were increased
by 16 per cent and those on the less congested A5 route reduced by 53 per
cent). These schemes demonstrate that more diVerentiated charging sys-
tems can be introduced successfully with existing technologies. The pricing
innovations introduced were supported with an intensive information
campaign, which was facilitated by only having to convey information
about two charges (peak/oV-peak). Toll road operators were also required
to ensure revenue neutrality, a policy that enhanced the acceptability of
introducing diVerentiated charges.
The demonstrations conducted in EUROTOLL and CONCERT-P
provide a diVerent kind of evidence on possible impacts of pricing
innovations. Both studies conducted experiments on the responses of a
panel of over 100 volunteers to the introduction of urban road-user
charges. Several factors urge caution in the interpretation of the results
of these demonstrations. These include the volunteer nature of the
demonstrations, the form of ‘‘charging’’ used (compensation based on
the saving an individual achieved by choosing cheaper forms of travel,
relative to the saving achieved by the overall panel of volunteers; com-
pensation paid once the experiments were concluded, rather than on a
day-to-day basis) and the introduction of high frequency, bus-based
park and ride systems. Although the magnitudes of response should be
treated with caution, the order of the groups of alternative travel choices
made by the volunteers has strong policy implications. Those individuals
who changed their behaviour did so in the following order: ®rst,
adapting the way in which they used their car (re-timing to avoid peak
period charges, re-routeing, change of destination); second, making use
of ‘‘quasi-private’’ forms of transport (in particular, the newly intro-
duced park and ride services); and, lastly, using conventional public
transport modes. Marginal social cost-based charging implies more dif-
ferentiated charges, so that this diversity of responses to new forms of
charging urges caution in forecasting and providing for new demand
patterns.
In terms of an implementation strategy for more diVerentiated pricing,
many studies highlight the challenge of persuading public and political
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opinion of the merits of more diVerentiation. For example, the TRANS-
PRICE surveys of public acceptability (Eurotrans, 1998) ®nd that a bare
majority of car drivers ®nd urban road pricing acceptable, but only when
such a policy is packaged with complementary measures such as enhanced
public transport. The TRENEN II study provides an economic welfare
perspective that revenue raised should not necessarily be invested in
transport sector initiatives. This may be interpreted as highlighting the
need to allocate any revenue gains to productive uses that capture the
support of the general public. Another insight from TRENEN II is that
simple innovations such as the introduction of a cordon pricing scheme
can capture most of the bene®ts of a highly complex scheme such as
electronic road pricing, even before the relative costs of a more ‘‘sophis-
ticated’’ system are considered. The TRENEN model, however, is not a
network model, and thus cannot deal with the complexities of re-routeing
that a cordon pricing scheme may create; other studies (for example, May
and Milne, 2000) suggest that this may be a signi®cant problem depending
on the geography of the network in question.
The FATIMA study (May et al., 1998) examines transport strategies
for a range of European cities, concluding that road pricing performs
better than other policies (such as modifying parking charges, increasing
®nancial support for public transport) in only one third of the cities
studied. Such comparative analysis reinforces the point that pricing
reforms need to be subjected to a cost-bene®t analysis alongside other
forms of intervention; it cannot be assumed that they will be the most cost-
eVective approach in every case.
Taken together, these pricing-related projects oVer powerful insights
into the methodologies underlying pricing policy development, directions
of change of prices, possible outcomes, and the development of viable
strategies.
Conclusions
The European Commission has moved in recent years towards ®rm sup-
port for the principle of marginal social cost pricing. Nevertheless, there
remains substantial opposition to this principle and indeed some EC
measures themselves still appear to support pricing for total cost recovery
in certain parts of the transport sector.
We believe this opposition is generally misguided. EC research has
shown that the methodology to calculate marginal social cost for all
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modes exists, although many of the valuations remain subject to con-
siderable uncertainty. We do not believe the argument that says that the
concept of marginal cost pricing cannot be implemented in practice
because it is unmeasurable. Nor do ®nancial, equity or practicability
considerations justify departing from the basic principles, although they
certainly justify modi®cation of them to take into account second-best
arguments concerning ®nancing needs, distributional weights and the
optimal degree of complexity. The strongest case for opposition probably
concerns the risk of unforeseen damaging consequences regarding land use
and economic development. Given the importance of externalities and
imperfect competition in this area, second-best considerations justify
caution in asserting that the introduction of marginal social cost pricing in
the transport sector in isolation will necessarily improve welfare; this
remains a priority for further research.
We have shown that a purely commercial approach to transport pricing
is not appropriate and may push prices in the wrong direction. The reason
is the prevalence in the transport sector of economies of scale, including
the Mohring eVect whereby increases in demand for scheduled public
transport services lead to increased service frequency and therefore better
services for existing passengers, and because of the importance of
externalities. While the former lead to commercial prices being too high,
and the latter too low, the relative strength of the two eVects diVers
enormously between modes and locations.
The eVects of moving to a more ecient pricing system are likely to be
diverse, both because of diVering circumstances between countries and
because of diVerent starting points. For instance in some countries rail fares
are held very low, whereas in others they are close to commercial levels. This
makes it dicult to generalise about the eVects of ecient pricing from a
small number of case studies. However, the simple belief that a move to
more ecient pricing would universally bene®t the more environmentally
friendly modes at the expense of other modes is found to be not true. For
instance, the current price of inter-urban motoring in the case studies is seen
to be too high relative to 2010 marginal social cost. This gives little support
for the introduction of additional charges on inter-urban roads except for
speci®c cases of serious congestion or especially strong environmental
eVects. On the other hand, the case for urban road pricing in congested cities
is rearmed. Similarly, regarding public transport, while there is generally a
case for lower prices and increased trac, in some cases existing subsidies
are already excessive. Only in the urban case study is a substantial diversion
of trac to public transport justi®ed.
In the case of road freight, the picture is mixed but generally there is
under-charging of long distance road freight. This is partly a problem of
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the structure of the existing taxation system. Fuel taxes do not increase
suciently with the weight (and particularly the axle weight) of the vehicle
to re¯ect the marginal social cost of heavy vehicles. An annual charge
overcharges low mileage vehicles and under charges vehicles used inten-
sively on long distance work. Even the vignette, as currently utilised, is
related to time rather than distance run. Thus there is a clear case for
reform of road freight vehicle taxation, to introduce a charge based both
on vehicle characteristics and distance travelled.
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